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Introduction
As most economies have been implementing severe …scal consolidation processes, the debate is open on the e¤ectiveness of what has been called "economic austerity" (Gros 2011 ,Blanchard and Leigh 2013 , Mauro et al 2013 . If the reduction of debt-to-GDP ratios is believed to be the most appropriate measure of the e¤ectiveness of …scal consolidations processes, it is necessary to acknowledge the presence of several ways in which changes in the …scal position can actually achieve the objective, at least in the short-run.
This short note outlines a simple theoretical framework in which such a transmission mechanism can be properly analyzed. Using the arithmetic of government budget constraint, this note identi…es and discusses the conditions under which a change in primary balance causes a change of the same sign in the debt-to-GDP ratio. We employ this condition as a measure of the e¤ectiveness of austerity.
Our starting point is that there are three forces acting on the transmission chain from primary budget changes to debt-to-GDP dynamics. One is direct: ceteris paribus, an increase/decrease in the government net absoption of resources causes an increase/decrease of the stock of nominal debt. The other two are indirect, and work in opposite ways: an increase (decrease) in primary de…cit increases (decreases) nominal growth in the short-run and therefore reduces (increases) debt-to-GDP ratio. At the same time, by modifying risk premia on the existing and new debt, increases (decreases) the average cost of debt and therefore increases (decreases) debt-to-GDP . We consider the government primary balance as the primitive …scal policy instrument, disregarding here the disaggregation between revenue and expenditure components of the budget.
Our results show that a given primary budget reduction is successful in causing an actual decrease of debt-to-GDP ratio only if elasticities of debt's average cost and nominal output with respect to primary de…cit satisfy certain conditions. The natural heterogeneity of those conditions across di¤erent economies (according to the composition of the total budget) can have a coordinated …scal policy move result in opposite e¤ects, even with similar values for elasticities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the setting and identi…es the conditions, providing also a graphical representation and an application to Euro-area economies. Section 3 discusses analytically the results and section 4 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
Conditions for e¤ectiveness of austerity
This section identi…es and discusses the conditions connecting changes in the policy instrument to their e¤ects on the debt-to-GDP ratio. We also present an application to major EMU economies.
The starting point is the simple nominal government ‡ow budget constraint:
where B t is the end-of-the-period stock of government nominal liabilities, # t is the average cost of debt (obtained by dividing interest payments by total stock of gross government liabilities) and D pr t is the primary budget de…cit 1 . We assume that # t is a function of D pr t , as changes in primary budget a¤ect risk premia on new debt and therefore its average cost, even though the last step crucially depends on debt's maturity structure.
In order to express (1) in terms of debt-to-GDP dynamics, we divide it by nominal GDP (Y t ):
The above expression is the familiar law of motion of the stock of government liabilities relative to aggregate output (Marattin and Marzo 2010 > 0 in the short run, because under nominal rigidities output is demand-determined. We cannot make unambiguous statements on " DY in the long run, for two fundamental reasons. First, we do not have any a-priori on the cyclical position of the economy; a de…cit-…nanced push in aggregate demand might have long-term e¤ect if used to close output gap. Second, as mentioned in the Introduction, we disregard the distinction between expenditure and revenue components of the primary de…cit; while the former -assuming non-productive public spending -has no real e¤ects in the long run, the latter might do.
It is crucial to remind that " -being based on percentage change as some of the empirical studies -is even more dependant on the state of the economy, as it is the product of the multiplier and the primary balance-to-GDP ratio. As the latter is often very modest, it is very unlikely that, regardless the multiplier's size, the elasticity is greater than one.
After a simple manipulation equation (2) becomes:
where we denote by " D# = Let's now study the sign, assuming that the budget displays a primary de…cit (D pr t > 0) : If (3) is positive, it means that a de…cit reduction succeeds in causing a reduction in debt-to-GDP ratio. We call this scenario "pro-austerity", in order to indicate that a given decrease in primary budget is e¤ective in reducing the stock of government liabilities as a ratio to nominal income.
If, on the other hand, (3) is negative, then a de…cit reduction increases the debt-to-GDP ratio and the budget consolidation results to be ine¤ective. We label this scenario "anti-austerity".
pro austerity :
anti austerity :
Obviously when (3) is equal to zero, then changes in primary de…cit do not a¤ect debt-to-GDP ratio. In that case the three e¤ects recalled in the introduction o¤set each other. . 4 Romer and Romer 2010, using the so-called "narrative approach", …nd it to be larger than three.
Looking at expression (3) it is easy to spot the su¢ cient condition for the prevailence of the pro or anti austerity regime. A budget consolidation is certainly successful if j " DY t j< min j " D# t j; 1 , whereas the "anti-austerity" regime dominates if j " DY t j> max j " D# t j; 1 . Given that, as noted above, it is quite unlikely that those elasticities are greater than one, those conditions basically tell us that a primary budget consolidation is certainly e¤ective if the elasticity of nominal output to primary de…cit is lower that the elasticity of the average cost of debt. Otherwise, the output loss associated to a budget consolidation is too large to allow for an actual reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
In order to compute the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the prevailence of the pro/anti austerity regime it is necessary to study the sign of (3):
which means:
Multiplying both sides by D pr t it becomes:
Note that the term
+ 1 is the inverse of the share of total primary de…cit devoted to interest payments on past debt.
To account for the possibility that the primary budget position displays a surplus S pr t (= D pr t ) rather than a de…cit, the above conditions can be expressed in absolute values. We therefore state that a given change in primary budget is successful in creating the expected change in debt-to-GDP ratio if:
and it produces the opposite e¤ect if, instead:
In other words, the e¤ectiveness of a …scal policy aimed at reducing the stock of government liabilities relative to nominal income depends on the position of " D# with respect to a thresold " = 
Bt 1#t
Such a threshold can be drawn in a space " A given combination of the two elasticities allows an actual debt-to-GDP reduction after a primary budget consolidation only if it falls in the "pro-austerity" space. The threshold line " represents the locus of elasticities " We can observe that in 2011 Spain had the smallest "pro-austerity" space, whereas Germany had the widest. Hence a coordinated …scal policy move (even in presence of similar values of elasticities " DY t and " D# t ) can have opposite e¤ects on their respective debt-to-GDP ratios if we are anywhere in the space between the two lines. 6 3 What can change the pro-austerity space? Figure 2 clearly shows that the threshold line " can considerably di¤er across similar countries, according to their budget position. This section analyzes the framework outlined in section 2, focusing on how di¤erent structure of budget de…cits at any point in time can increase or decrease the likelihood of a budget consolidation plan's success.
The partial derivative of the threshold " with respect to interest payments reads:
which shows us that countries with higher interest payments on the existing stock of debt see their pro-austerity space decrease for any " DY t < 1 and increase for any "
In other words, if a country has an higher interest rate payment, a given reduction in primary budget de…cit has a lower (higher) chance to succeed if nominal output elasticity to primary de…cit is smaller (greater) than one.
What is the intuition of that result?
In order to understand it, let us recall the fundamental equation (2), written in a way that can best emphasize the three transmission channel from D 
and the derivative with respect to primary de…cit is given by:
where we have a "direct" e¤ect
Yt indicating the movement of the primary de…cit-to-GDP ratio, and an "indirect" e¤ect
indicating the joint e¤ect of primary budget changes on current nominal income and the average cost of debt.
If "
t is completely o¤set by a corresponding 1% contraction in nominal output Y , so that the "direct" e¤ect is zero. The only e¤ects at work are the two operating on the …rst and second member on the right-hand-side of (10), summarized by the "indirect" e¤ect in (11) . Therefore it is clear that an actual reduction of If " DY t < 1 the direct channel is positive, as the primary de…cit-to-GDP ratio diminishes after a reduction in D pr t , therefore Bt Yt tends to rise. At the same time the indirect e¤ect is negative (so a reduction in primary de…cit increases debt) as for any " DY t < 1 it is also true that on the threshold line " . The magnitude of this latter e¤ect (pushing towards an increase -rather than decrease -of debt-to-GDP ratio) is bigger the higher the share of de…cit devoted to interest payments (# t B t 1 ) : Therefore an higher # t B t 1 shrinks the area where austerity is e¤ective.
The opposite happens when " DY t > 1. In this case the direct e¤ect is negative, as the nominal income falls more than primary de…cit. As a result primaryde…cit-to-GDP ratio increases, and debt-to-GDP ratio tends to increase. The indirect e¤ect, however, is positive, since on the threshold line " 
Conclusions
The main dimension on which the success of austerity measures can be evaluated is their ability to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio. This paper o¤ers a very simple theoretical framework to analyze how and when …scal policy decisions can be successful in that sense.
The main result is that the e¤ectiveness of budget consolidation plans depends crucially on how much percentage change in primary budget result in percentage changes in the average cost of debt and in nominal output. The …rst elasticity depends on a predetermined variable (the maturity structure of the existing stock of debt) and on the impact of de…cit changes on the cost of new debt issuing. The second elasticity is even more signi…cant, as it involves (but does not coincide with) the …scal policy multiplier. This latter elasticity is very much dependant on the cyclical position of the economy and on the primary budget-to-GDP ratio (in turn depending on the state of the cycle). Hence the success of a given budget consolidation can considerably vary according to a much wider set of variables than it seems to be understood nowadays.
